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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Early in life, one discovers that there are two topics to be avoided in “civilized” 
conversation—politics and religion; in fact, their blood-boiling effects are outdone 
by only one other topic—the politics of religion.  Although many argue that little, if 
any, “civilized” conversation occurs on Capitol Hill, few can dispute the fact that the 
politics of religion have been the center of many Congressional debates in recent 
years.  For example, in June of 1998, Congress, by joint resolution, proposed an 
amendment to the United States Constitution aimed at restoring religious freedom.1  
                                                                
1Constitutional Amendment Restoring Religious Freedom, H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong. 
(1998); 144 CONG. REC. H4078-04 (daily ed. June 4, 1998). 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
250 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:249 
Likewise, the House passed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.2  
Previously, in 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was signed into law to 
prevent government from substantially burdening an individual’s free exercise of 
religion.3  Finally, for more than four years, both Houses of Congress have been 
proposing an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 in the form of 
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA).5 
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is the focus of this note.6  The Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act represents another Congressional attempt to fortify the 
“reasonable accommodations” and “undue hardship” standards of Title VII with 
regard to religious discrimination in the workplace;7 the WRFA does so in the face of 
Supreme Court decisions which have narrowed the scope of those standards,8 eased 
burdens on employers, and valiantly guarded the citadel of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment Clause.9 
Specifically, this note will analyze the potential constitutional infirmity of the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act in light of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
and the Court’s rather murky guidance on the constitutionality of existing Title VII 
standards.  The Establishment Clause concerns created by the WRFA must be 
considered seriously because the aforementioned religious air on Capitol Hill assures 
that the WRFA will be resurrected in the 106th Congress.  This note ultimately 
suggests that the WRFA distorts the meaning of “accommodation,” places too great a 
burden on employers, and disproportionately raises religious interests above secular 
                                                                
2H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1998); 144 CONG. REC. H3294 (daily ed. May 14, 1998). 
3Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).  
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 had been codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4 
(1994), but the law was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (giving the definition of 
“religion”). 
5See S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997) (Version 2); see also S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997) (Version 
1); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997).  Apparently, Hon. Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced 
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act in 1994.  See 140 CONG. REC. E2157-01, (daily ed. Oct. 
6, 1994).  Also, House Bill 2948 was reintroduced into the House by Hon. William F. 
Goodling of Pennsylvania on Tuesday, January 27, 1998.  See 144 CONG. REC. E4-02 (1998). 
6This note will analyze the 1997 Senate Version 2 of WRFA. 
742 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).  Under Title VII, the term “religion” includes “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is 
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”  
Id. 
8See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that bearing more 
than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee’s religious needs constitutes an undue 
hardship on the employer); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986) 
(holding that an employer is not required to adopt the reasonable accommodation that is most 
beneficial to the employee). 
9
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
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economic concerns of the workplace—all of which add up to a losing battle on the 
Establishment Clause front. 
While not discounting the importance of religious observance in everyday life, 
this note concludes that Title VII should be left as is, and that, perhaps, the interests 
of religious observers—especially Sabbatarians—could be bolstered under the 
auspices of other existing, and more broadly-based, labor and employment 
legislation. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as originally enacted, prohibited 
employers from failing or refusing to hire, from discharging, and from discriminating 
against any individual regarding compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.10  However, the 1964 version of Title VII did not include the “reasonable 
accommodations” requirement for employers which exists in the current form.11  
“Reasonable accommodations” evolved out of guidelines enacted by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).12  In 1966, the EEOC first 
                                                                
10Title VII—Equal Employment Opportunity, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2).  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated, in 
part, the following: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status 
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
Id. 
11Id. at §§ 701-703; see also supra note 7. 
12The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as originally established, was given 
power with regard to the following: 
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, state, local, and other 
agencies, both public and private, and individuals; 
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are summoned before the 
Commission or any of its agents the same witnesses and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses 
in the courts of the United States; 
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this title such technical assistance as they may request 
to further their compliance with this title or an order issued thereunder; 
(4) upon request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some of them, or (ii) any labor 
organization, whose members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in 
effectuating the provisions of this title, to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such 
other remedial action as is provided by this title; 
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and 
policies of this title and to make the results of such studies available to the public; 
(6) to refer matters to the Attorney General with recommendations for intervention in a 
civil action brought by an aggrieved party under section 706, or for the institution of a civil 
action by the Attorney General under section 707, and to advise, consult, and assist the 
Attorney General on such matters. 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258-59 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4).  
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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promulgated guidelines requiring employers to accommodate the religious practices 
of employees unless such accommodation would create a “serious inconvenience to 
the conduct of the business.”13  One year later, the EEOC revised its guidelines 
excusing the reasonable accommodation only if the employer could prove an “undue 
hardship.”14 
The work of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was frustrated 
somewhat, in 1970, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in 
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., expressed the opinion that the EEOC guidelines were 
not consistent with the purposes of the 1964 Act to the extent that they compelled an 
employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of another.15  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit on other grounds, but because the judgment 
was entered by an equally divided Court it was not “entitled to precedential 
weight.”16  However, the authority of the EEOC was further questioned in Riley v. 
Bendix Corp.17 Referencing the fact that the 1967 EEOC guidelines required the 
employer to bear the burden of proof in establishing undue hardship, the Riley court 
stated the following: 
We do not believe that the Commission is vested with the authority of 
determining the procedural question of burden of proof . . . . [W]e feel it 
would be unreasonable and impractical to require the complex American 
business structure to prove why it cannot gear itself to the ‘varied 
religious practices of the American people.’18  
Congress immediately responded to the Dewey and Riley opinions by passing the 
1972 amendment to Title VII which incorporated the 1967 EEOC guidelines 
excusing “reasonable accommodations” in the face of “undue hardship.”19 
Although “undue hardship” is the standard on which employer compliance 
hinges, the standard went undefined in the 1972 amendment.  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court shaped the Title VII landscape by its decisions. 
The seminal decision in Title VII religious discrimination litigation is Trans 
World Airlines v. Hardison.20  In Hardison, the Court held that an “undue hardship” 
exists if an employer is required to bear more than a de minimis cost to provide a 
                                                                
13Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1966). 
14Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). 
15429 F.2d 324, 331 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 
(1971).  The Sixth Circuit actually held, in part, that the employer had made a reasonable 
accommodation by allowing the employee to obtain a replacement for his shift, thus making it 
possible for him to observe a Sunday Sabbath.  Id. at 331. 
16Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972). 
17330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971). 
18Id. at 588-89. 
19See 118 CONG. REC. 705-31 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1972); see also supra note 7. 
20432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
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reasonable accommodation.21  Displeasure with the Court’s low de minimis standard 
was immediate as Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote in dissent: 
[The] decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to 
accommodate work requirements to religious practices.  The Court holds, 
in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an 
employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take 
account of religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really 
mean what they say.22 
Essentially, many feel that the Court’s decision did nothing more than invalidate and 
ignore the intent of the Act and trivialize protections offered to religiously-dedicated 
employees.23 
Nearly ten years after Hardison, the Supreme Court again narrowed the scope of 
the employer’s duty under Title VII in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.24 In 
Philbrook, the Court reversed a portion of a decision of the United States Court of 
                                                                
21Id. at 84.  Hardison was a clerk in the Stores Department at TWA who sought Saturdays 
off in order to observe the Sabbath of his chosen religion—the Worldwide Church of God.  Id. 
at 66-67.  After participating in a temporary “shift swap,” Hardison received an intra-company 
transfer, but, as a result, lost seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement which 
had previously allowed him to bid for, and easily obtain, Saturday-free shifts.  Id. at 68.  
Hardison was eventually discharged for insubordination after refusing to show up for 
scheduled Saturday shifts.  Id. at 68-69. 
In reaching its decision, the Court was adamant about protecting the integrity of the 
collective bargaining agreement in place at TWA.  Id. at 81.  The Court stated that: 
It would be anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation” Congress 
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as 
well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the 
religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer 
to go that far.  Id. 
22Id. at 86-87. 
23See Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the 
Different Applications of the Reasonable Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 
73 IND. L.J. 745, 761 (1998) (suggesting that by setting the de minimis standard, the Hardison 
Court “read the adjective ‘undue’ out of the Act.”); see also Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious 
Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 789, 799 (1997) 
(suggesting that “undue hardship” analysis in religious accommodation claims amounts to 
nothing more than a “hypothetical protection”). 
24479 U.S. 60 (1986).  Philbrook was a high school teacher in Ansonia, Connecticut, and, 
as a member of the Worldwide Church of God, missed approximately six school days per year 
for observance of religious holy days.  Id. at 62-63.  Under the collective bargaining 
agreement between the Board and teacher’s union, three days of paid leave was annually 
provided for observance of mandatory religious holidays.  Id. at 63-64.  An additional three 
days could be taken for “necessary personal business,” but this was understood not to include 
religious observance.  Id. 
For a time, Philbrook used “personal” days for religious purposes and his pay was 
accordingly reduced for such unauthorized leave.  Id. at 64-65.  While indicating that the 
school board policy requiring Philbrook to take unpaid leave for holy day observance was 
probably reasonable, the Court remanded the case for factual findings on whether paid leave 
was provided for all purposes except religious ones.  Id. at 70-71. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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Appeals for the Second Circuit that an employer must choose the reasonable 
accommodation that is preferred by, and most beneficial to, the employee.25 In its 
opinion, the Court clarified that “where the employer has already reasonably 
accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end . . . 
[and] the employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative 
accommodations would result in undue hardship.”26 Again, as he had done in 
Hardison, Justice Marshall led the charge in dissent, expounding that an employer’s 
duty to accommodate should include consideration of the employee’s proposals if the 
employer is unable to fully resolve the conflict with his own proposals.27 
Characteristic of its early involvement in Title VII affairs, the EEOC enacted 
aggressive guidelines in response to both the Hardison and Philbrook decisions.  
Although the EEOC held the line on the de minimis threshold in terms of “undue 
hardship,” it factored into the equation “the identifiable cost in relation to the size 
and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will . . . need 
a particular accommodation.”28  Likewise, the guidelines mandate that employers 
implement the accommodation which least disadvantages the employee, in those 
cases where multiple accommodations exist which would not cause undue 
hardship.29  Still, because EEOC guidelines are sometimes not accorded great weight 
in Court decisions,30  the most effective way to “restore . . . the original intent of 
Title VII’s protections for religious observances and practices,” is through 
legislation.31 
However, any governmental undertaking promoting affirmative action in the 
name of religion must first be found to be constitutionally “pure,” for the First 
Amendment espouses the principle that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”32  By its very nature, Title VII warrants criticism as a 
law “establishing religion” because it requires private employers to accommodate, 
and arguably to provide preferential treatment for, religious observers.33  As one 
commentator has suggested, “the statute . . . clearly has the nonsecular objective of 
                                                                
25Id. at 68-69. 
26Id. at 68. 
27Id. at 72-73. 
2829 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1996). 
2929 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1996). 
30See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 n.6 (noting that EEOC guidelines are properly accorded 
less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law). 
31To Amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Establish Provisions With 
Respect to Religious Accommodation in Employment, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 
1124 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources United States Senate, 105th Cong. 1 
(1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Senator Coats). 
32U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
33See 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
225 (Paul W. Cane Jr. ed., American Bar Ass’n 3d. ed. 1996). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
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improving the employment position of religious employees, rather than improving 
the status of all employees, religious or nonreligious.”34 
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court of the United States, as a whole, has had 
little to say definitively regarding the constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable 
accommodations” provision.  Nevertheless, lower courts and individual Supreme 
Court members have commented on the subject sparingly.  Interpreting the 
significance of what each has said necessitates an inquiry into Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 
III.  TITLE VII AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The fundamental test employed in Establishment Clause challenges was fleshed 
out by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.35  In Lemon, the Court held that 
two state statutes36 violated the Establishment Clause because they provided state aid 
to church-related elementary and secondary schools, in part, by reimbursing the cost 
for teachers’ salaries and secular textbooks.37  The Lemon Court determined that in 
order for a statute to remain consistent with the Establishment Clause, it must 
comply with each of the following: 1) the statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose; 2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor 
inhibits religion; and 3) the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with 
religion.38  While the Court found that both state statutes complied with the first two 
prongs of the test, it held that continual monitoring of teacher performance and 
method—so as to ensure that religious tenets were not being blended into secular 
subjects—would involve excessive entanglement between church and state.39 
The Lemon test figured prominently in one of the earliest challenges to Title 
VII’s “reasonable accommodations” provision—Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.40  
Cummins was an employee who was fired for refusing to work on Saturday, which 
was the Sabbath of his chosen religion of the Worldwide Church of God.41  In 
                                                                
34Ronald W. Eades, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—An Unconstitutional Attempt 
to Establish Religion, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 72 (1980); see also Cummins v. Parker Seal 
Co., 516 F.2d 544, 558 (6th 1975) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (stating, in part, that the 
religious accommodation requirement of Title VII discriminates between religion and non-
religion), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). 
35403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
36The statutes in question were the products of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island 
legislatures.  Id. at 606. 
37Id. 
38Id. at 612-13. 
39403 U.S. at 613-19. 
40516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), 
judgment vacated by 433 U.S. 903 (1977).  Note that the Sixth Circuit in Cummins actually 
cites Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), for its Establishment 
Clause test, but the test is unquestionably the one that evolved from Lemon.  See 516 F.2d at 
551-52. 
41516 F.2d at 545.  Cummins filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and a complaint with the Kentucky 
Commission on Human Rights (KCHR).  Id.  The KCHR originally found that the employer’s 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
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passing on the constitutionality of Title VII, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII had 
the adequate secular purpose of preventing discrimination in employment.42  
Comparing Title VII to the statute allowing conscientious objector exemption, the 
court stated that “the reasonable accommodation rule reflects a legislative judgment 
that . . . certain persons will not compromise their religious convictions and that they 
should not be punished for the supremacy of conscience.”43  With regard to the 
second prong of the test, the court held that Title VII neither advanced nor inhibited 
religion, in part, because it did not mandate financial support for religious 
institutions.44  Furthermore, the court stated that according to the Supreme Court, “a 
law is not necessarily unconstitutional merely because it confers incidental or 
indirect benefits upon religious institutions.”45  Finally, the court did not find 
excessive entanglement fostered by Title VII because it required little or no contact 
between religious institutions and governmental entities.46  The court emphasized:  
“[T]he EEOC and the courts will have to determine simply whether the employer has 
made a reasonable accommodation and whether an undue hardship will result.  These 
issues will be considered in the labor relations context, and their resolution certainly 
does not necessitate any governmental entanglement with religion.”47 
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Sixth Circuit, it did so 
by an equally divided Court.48  In addition, the Supreme Court later vacated the 
judgment and remanded in light of its decision in Hardison.49  Based on the 
Hardison decision, the Sixth Circuit, on remand, affirmed the original decision of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and dismissed 
Cummins’s complaint.50  Thus, Title VII’s constitutional status remanded in limbo.  
                                                          
attempts to accommodate Cummins’s religious needs resulted in undue hardship to the 
employer and it dismissed the complaint.  Id. at 545-46.  Cummins subsequently filed an 
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky.  Id.  Based on 
the factual record developed before the KCHR, the district court held that the employer was 
justified in discharging Cummins and it dismissed the complaint.  Id. at 546.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court, finding 
no substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that making the 
accommodation would cause undue hardship.  516 F.2d at 550.  Moreover, the Sixth Circuit 
dispensed with a constitutional challenge to Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations” 
requirement, holding that it did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 552-53. 
42Id. at 552.  The Sixth Circuit relied on the remarks of Senator Randolph, the sponsor of 
the 1972 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that it was his desire “to assure that 
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers [was] for all time 
guaranteed by law.”  Id. (citing 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972)). 
43Id. at 552-53. 
44Id. at 553. 
45Id. (citation omitted). 
46Cummins, 516 F.2d at 553. 
47Id. at 553-54. 
48See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
49Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 433 U.S. 903 (1977). 
50Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 561 F.2d 658-59 (6th Cir. 1977). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
1999] POLITICS OF RELIGION 257 
Still, over the next ten years, several Supreme Court Justices hinted at the 
constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations” feature.  For instance, 
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, stated outright that “I think it beyond 
dispute that [Title VII] does and, consistently with the First Amendment, can require 
employers to grant privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation 
process.”51  Additionally, Marshall expressed the view that “the mere fact that the 
law sometimes requires special treatment of religious practitioners does not present 
the dangers of ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the 
sovereign in religious activity’ against which the Establishment Clause is principally 
aimed.”52  Similarly, Justice O’Connor subsequently explained: 
[A] statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring 
employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society.  Since 
Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and 
extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than 
protecting only the Sabbath observance . . . an objective observer would 
perceive it as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of 
religion or a particular religious practice.53 
The “absolute accommodation,” from which Justice O’Connor tried to 
distinguish Title VII, was a standard the Court reviewed in Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.54  
Thornton involved a Connecticut statute that prohibited an employer from requiring 
an employee to work on a day of the week that the employee observed as his chosen 
Sabbath.55  Resorting to the Lemon test, the Court held that the statute violated the 
Establishment Clause because it created an “unyielding weighting in favor of 
Sabbath observers over all other interests”56 and, thus, went “beyond having an 
incidental or remote effect of advancing religion.”57  The Court placed particular 
emphasis on the manner in which the statute mandated that religious interests control 
over the secular interests of the workplace and on the fact that the statute lacked 
exceptions; for example, the statute gave no consideration to the burdens placed on 
the employer or co-employees or to whether the employer had proposed any 
reasonable accommodations.58 
                                                                
51Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
52Id. at 92 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970)). 
53Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
54Id. at 703. 
55Id. at 704-05. 
56Id. at 710. 
57Id. 
58472 U.S. at 709-10. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999
258 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:249 
Thus, in addition to Cummins, and a group of other lower court decisions 
upholding the constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations,”59 the 
Thornton decision, and especially O’Connor’s concurring opinion, seemed to 
solidify the otherwise precarious Establishment Clause ground on which Title VII 
stood.60  Specifically, it delineated the dichotomy of permissible and impermissible 
accommodations for religion: reasonable, but not absolute.  One scholar noted the 
dichotomy while calling for and proposing changes to Title VII: 
[B]arring a requirement of absolute accommodation . . . a standard more 
protective of employees than the de minimis standard would not seem to 
violate the Establishment Clause.  The Court could have measured undue 
hardship against a reasonable-costs standard or arguably even against a 
significant-expense standard, like that of the ADA, and still met the 
requirements of the Lemon test.61 
IV.  THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT 
In 1997, Congress introduced an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e entitled the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA).62  In general, the WRFA proposed the 
                                                                
59See McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottelson v. Smith Steel 
Workers D.A.L.U., 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 
1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098. 
60See Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 972; EEOC v. Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 724 F. Supp. 881 (M.D. Fla. 1989). 
61Schuchman, supra note 23, at 758-59; see also Miller, supra note 23, at 791 (proposing 
that incorporation of the 1996 EEOC guidelines into Title VII, taking into account “the 
identifiable cost in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer” and “the number of 
individuals needing the accommodation” would be constitutional in the face of Establishment 
Clause scrutiny). 
62See supra notes 5-6.  The text of S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997), is as follows: 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
 This Act may be cited as the “Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1997.” 
SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS. 
 (a) DEFINITIONS—Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 
2000e(j)) is amended— 
(1) by inserting “(1)” after “(j)” ; 
  (2) by inserting “, after initiating and engaging in an affirmative and bona 
fide effort,” after “unable”; 
  (3) by striking “an employee’s” and all that follows through “religious”  
and insert “an employee’s religious”; and 
  (4) by adding at the end the following: 
 “(2) As used in this subsection, the term ‘employee’ includes a prospective  
employee. 
 “(3) As used in this subsection, the term ‘undue hardship’ means an accommodation  
requiring significant difficulty or expense.  For purposes of determining whether an  
accommodation requires significant difficulty or expense— 
  “(A) an accommodation shall be considered to require significant  
difficulty or expense if the accommodation will result in the inability  
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of an employee to perform the essential functions of the employment position of 
the employee; and 
  “(B) other factors to be considered in making the determination shall 
include— 
   “(i) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including  
the costs of loss of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or  
transferring employees from one facility to another, in relation to the  
size and operating cost of the employer; 
   “(ii) the number of individuals who will need the particular  
accommodation to a religious observance or practice; and 
   “(iii) for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree  
to which the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of  
the facilities will make the accommodation more difficult or expensive.” 
 (b) EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES—Section 703 of such Act (42 U.S.C 2000e-2) is  
amended by adding at the end the following: 
 “(o)(1) As used in this subsection: 
  “(A) The term ‘employee’ includes a prospective employee. 
  “(B) The term ‘leave of general usage’ means leave provided under  
the policy or program of an employer, under which 
   “(i) an employee may take leave by adjusting or altering  
the work schedule or assignment of the employee according to criteria 
determined by the employer; and 
   “(ii) the employee may determine the purpose for which 
                the leave is to be utilized. 
  “(C) The term ‘undue hardship’ has the meaning given the term in  
section 701(j)(3). 
 “(2) For purposes of determining whether an employer has committed an  
unlawful employment practice under this title by failing to provide a reasonable 
accommodation to the religious observance or practice of an employee, an  
accommodation by the employer shall not be deemed to be reasonable if 
such accommodation does not remove the conflict between employment requirements  
and the religious observance or practice of the employee. 
 “(3) An employer shall be considered to commit such a practice by failing to  
provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the employer  
refuses to permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to remove such  
a conflict solely because the leave will be used to accommodate the religious  
observance or practice of the employee. 
 “(4)It shall not be a defense to a claim of unlawful employment practice under  
this title for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to a religious  
observance or practice of an employee that such accommodation would be in  
violation of a bona fide seniority system if, in order for the employer to  
reasonably accommodate such observance or practice — 
  “(A) an adjustment would be made in the employee’s work hours 
(including an adjustment that requires the employee to work overtime in order to  
avoid working at a time that abstention from work is necessary to satisfy religious 
requirements), shift, or job assignment, that would not be available to any employee  
but for such accommodation; or 
  “(B) the employee and any other employee would voluntarily  
exchange shifts or job assignments, or voluntarily make some other arrangement  
between the employees. 
 “(5)(A) An employer shall not be required to pay premium wages or confer 
premium benefits for work performed during hours to which such premium wages or premium 
benefits would ordinarily be applicable, if work is performed during such hours only to 
accommodate religious requirements of an employee.  
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following changes to Title VII: 1) defining “undue hardship” to mean an 
accommodation requiring “significant difficulty or expense,” thus adopting the 
Americans with Disabilities Act definition and effectively nullifying the Supreme 
Court’s de minimis standard established in Hardison; 2) determining if “significant 
difficulty or expense” exists based on if the accommodation results in the inability of 
an employee to perform the essential functions of the employment position and also 
by considering the identifiable cost to the employer, the number of individuals 
needing the particular accommodation, and any added difficulty that would be 
involved by the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of 
multiple work facilities; (3) requiring that for an accommodation to be considered 
“reasonable” the employer must remove the conflict between employment 
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee; (4) 
prohibiting an employer from preventing an employee from utilizing “general leave” 
to accommodate the employee’s religious observance, thus clarifying a similar 
scenario discussed in Philbrook; (5) prohibiting an employer from using as a defense 
the claim that an accommodation would violate a bona fide seniority system if an 
adjustment would be made in the employee’s work hours, shift, or job assignment 
(that would not be available to any employee but for such accommodation), or if the 
employees could make voluntary arrangements for shift or job swaps.63 
In co-sponsoring the legislation, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts articulated that 
“the Workplace Religious Freedom Act represents our effort to try to create the 
proper balance between [Government prohibitions against] establishment of religion 
[and] . . . the curtailing of religious observances.”64  Unfortunately, the good Senator 
may have contributed to tipping Title VII’s scales too far in favor of establishment, 
prompting one person to testify before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources that “the severest test for [The Workplace Religious Freedom Act] will be 
the Constitution and not particular quibbles about the statutory language.”65  
Notwithstanding indications that existing Title VII formulations are constitutional,66 
                                                          
    “(B) As used in this paragraph— 
  “(i) the term ‘premium benefit’ means an employment benefit, such as  
seniority, group life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick  
leave, annual leave, an educational benefit, or a pension, that is greater than  
the employment benefit due the regular work schedule of the employee; and 
  “(ii) the term ‘premium wages’ includes overtime pay and  
compensatory time off, premium pay for night, weekend, or holiday work, and  
premium pay for standby or irregular duty.” 
SECTION 3, EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS 
 (a) EFFECTIVE DATE—Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the 
amendments made by Section 2 take effect on the date of enactment of this Act. 
 (b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS -- The amendments made by Section 2 do 
not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this Act. 
63See supra note 62. 
64Hearings, supra note 31, at 2-3 (statement of Senator Kerry from Massachusetts). 
65Id. at 65-66 (statement of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University of Denver College 
of Law, Denver, Co.). 
66See supra text accompanying notes 32-61; see also Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the 
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317, 
1357 (1997) (suggesting that current Title VII would be constitutional based on general 
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this author submits that any future amendment to Title VII resembling the proposed 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act faces serious challenges on Establishment Clause 
grounds, either under the Lemon test or revisions of the Lemon test emphasizing 
“neutrality,”67 “endorsement,”68 or “coercion.”69 
V.  THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT:  NOTHING BUT A “LEMON” 
Assuming that, as an anti-discrimination law, Title VII has a valid secular 
purpose, the WRFA passes muster under the first prong of the Lemon test.  
Assuming further that over thirty years of court interpretation of Title VII claims has 
been achieved without significant difficulty, the courts are not likely to become 
excessively entangled if the WRFA is enacted.  However, there is a strong possibility 
that the WRFA could be struck down under Lemon’s second prong because it has the 
effect of advancing religion. 
A.  “Advancing Religion” 
1.  De Minimis Is the Maximum 
Conceptually, the low de minimis threshold stands as a monument to the Court’s 
desire to avoid Establishment Clause implications altogether in the Title VII arena,70 
and evidences a nonverbal warning that a higher threshold would constitutionally 
destroy an otherwise socially beneficial law.  Even Justices Marshall and Brennan, 
who generally gave Title VII (in its current form) a passing constitutional grade,71 
and who criticized the Hardison majority for setting the de minimis standard, hinted 
that “important constitutional questions would be posed by interpreting [Title VII] to 
compel employers (or fellow employees) to incur substantial costs to aid the 
religious observer . . . .”72 
                                                          
Supreme Court doctrines permitting the Government to take action tailored to protect 
individual religious freedom). 
67See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 
(1994).  Professor Corrada, of the University of Denver College of Law, actually commented 
before the Senate that if the Workplace Religious Freedom Act were an individual piece of 
legislation, it would clearly be held unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds.  
Hearings, supra note 31, at 66.  However, he felt that as an amendment to Title VII, it would 
survive because Title VII, as an anti-discrimination law, has a valid secular purpose.  Id.  It is 
this author’s opinion that, regardless of its secular purpose, WRFA faces severe challenges 
under the second prong of the Lemon test. 
68See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
69See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
70See Schuchman, supra note 23, at 758; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 
33, at 231; Hearings, supra note 31, at 58 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment 
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington, 
D.C.) (commenting, respectively, that the Court set a low de minimis standard to avoid any 
Establishment Clause conflicts). 
71See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. 
72Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
Marshall also explicitly stated that he was not deciding the merits of any constitutional 
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Clearly, the “significant difficulty or expense” threshold, proposed in an 
amendment like the WRFA, would awaken the “sleeping Establishment Clause dog” 
that the Hardison Court preferred to let lie.  An analogy to the Court’s decision in 
Thornton illustrates how this would occur.73  One commentator has noted the 
following: “Thornton hints at [a] difficulty with the statutory ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ requirement.  The Court’s opinion emphasized the burdens that 
Connecticut’s statute placed on employees and coworkers.  That is, accommodation 
in this context pits religious interests against economic ones.”74  While the de 
minimis interpretation of existing Title VII substantially reduces the degree to which 
Congress, and the government in general, is seen to have subordinated economic 
interests to religious ones,75 the “significant burden or expense” threshold proposed 
boosts religious interests greatly above those of secular economic concerns by 
forcing employers to incur greater costs to accommodate religiously-dedicated 
employees.  In other words, the enhanced standard would vault Title VII past the 
acceptable point of merely conferring an “incidental” or “indirect” benefit on 
religion.76 
2.  “Reasonable,” Unreasonably Advanced, Approaches “Absolute” 
Elements of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act requiring an employer to 
“initiate . . . an affirmative and bona fide effort” to provide an accommodation77 and 
to completely “remove the conflict” between employment requirements and the 
employee’s religious observance78 threaten to transform the “reasonable” 
accommodations concept into a type of “absolute” accommodation.79  Knowing, 
based on Thornton, that the Court would not view favorably any type of “absolute” 
threshold,80 there are two ways in which an explicit mandate to “remove the conflict” 
too closely resembles an “absolute” accommodation.  First, the WRFA distorts the 
meaning of “accommodation.”  Second, the WRFA forces the employer into 
acquiescing to and implementing employee-proposed accommodations.  
                                                          
objections that could be raised if Title VII were construed to require employers to assume 
significant costs in accommodating.  Id. at 91 n.3. 
73See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. 
74Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 
GEO. L.J. 1691, 1707 (1988). 
75Id. 
76See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
77See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full 
text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
78See S. 1124 § 2(b)(2); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act). 
79See Hearings, supra note 31, at 49 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment 
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington, 
D.C.) (suggesting that removing the conflict resembles an absolute standard). 
80See supra text accompanying notes 54-58. 
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a.  “You Mean ‘Accommodation’ as in ‘Compromise’ . . . Right?” 
Despite arguments by proponents of WRFA that “a reasonable accommodation 
has got to be an accommodation that lifts the conflict completely . . . or it is no 
accommodation at all;”81 such arguments distort the meaning of the word 
“accommodation,” connoting unilateral sacrifice on the part of the employer rather 
than mutual compromise by both parties.82  Contrary to the articulation of Justice 
Stevens that when a duty to accommodate arises, the employer has a statutory duty to 
remove the conflict,83 the courts have recognized that a “reasonable” accommodation 
can be, and often is, made short of complete conflict removal.  For example, in 
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., the Sixth Circuit held that an employer had made a 
reasonable accommodation for a Sunday Sabbatarian through a neutral policy of 
allowing him the opportunity to secure a replacement for his Sunday shift.84  The 
Dewey decision reflects the true nature of an “accommodation” as both parties 
shared the burden of conflict: the employer compromised by allowing the employee 
to seek a replacement, and the employee compromised by assuming the duty to find 
a replacement. 
Conversely, under the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, it seems that if the 
employee was forced to share in the burden of conflict resolution, that a Dewey 
accommodation might not even qualify for consideration as “reasonable.”  Rather, 
the employer might have to allow for an employee replacement and also attempt to 
secure that replacement.  Critics of the foregoing argument could point to the WRFA 
provision allowing for, and encouraging, voluntary job/shift swaps arranged by 
employees themselves.85  But such critics can be answered on two counts.  First, if 
WRFA intends for the employee to share in the removal of conflict, then language 
mandating that the employer “remove the conflict” is contradictory, unnecessary, 
and superfluous.  Second, the aforementioned voluntary job/shift swap allowance 
falls under a provision prohibiting employers from upholding an otherwise valid 
collective bargaining agreement which might not favor such swaps.86  Thus, WRFA 
constructively pushes “reasonable” into the realm of “absolute” by stripping the 
employer of discretion in business decisionmaking and, similar to the statute at issue 
in Thornton, forces the employer to “adjust [his] affairs to the command of the 
[Government] whenever the statute is invoked by the employee.”87  One practitioner 
                                                                
81Hearings, supra note 31, at 66 (comment of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University of 
Denver College of Law, Denver, Co.). 
82In common parlance, “accommodation” is understood as being synonymous with 
“compromise.”  See ROGET’S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 165 (1992).  “To compromise” 
means “to bind by mutual agreement” or “to adjust or settle by partial mutual relinquishment 
of principles, position, or claims.”  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 468 
(1971)(emphasis added). 
83Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 76 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
84429 F.2d 325 (6th. Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
85See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(B) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the 
full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
86See S. 1124 § 2(b)(4)(B). 
87Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (emphasis added). 
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put it best when he testified before the Senate that “the essential concept of an 
‘accommodation’ is for a means to be found to allow the co-existence of competing 
interests—not the elimination of either; [t]o eliminate the conflict means that the 
requested accommodation becomes a non-negotiable order.”88 
Of course, it is undisputed that Title VII, by requiring an accommodation at all, 
gives to employers a non-negotiable order.  However, the matter of degree is the 
important issue here, which, again, is what the Supreme Court implicitly said in 
Hardison.  The more non-negotiable orders that an amendment like WRFA is seen to 
give employers in the name of religion, the more Title VII gets pushed toward an 
“absolute” burden—a constitutionally unacceptable degree. 
Because the Supreme Court was equally divided in affirming Dewey, it attempted 
to solidify the concept of “accommodation” in Philbrook, considering an 
accommodation to be “reasonable” that would have required an employee to take 
unpaid leave for holy day observance.89  Clearly, an accommodation allowing unpaid 
leave does not technically remove the conflict completely because the employee 
must still forfeit a portion of his salary for the time off.90  Nevertheless, it “eliminates 
the conflict”91 to the extent that it signifies a mutual compromise: one in which the 
employer allows the employee to freely observe his holy days without threat of job 
loss or discipline, and the employee rightly gives up compensation for a day he does 
not work.92 
Additionally, the accommodation of “mutual” compromise93—one not always 
requiring complete conflict removal to the extent that the employee is burden-free—
is the concept that the Court prefers.  In Philbrook, the Court referenced the 
legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII, adopting the view of its 
sponsor, Senator Randolph, that accommodations be made with “flexibility” and “a 
desire to achieve an adjustment.”94  Likewise, the Court noted a decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which it was stated that 
“bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of 
the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s 
business.”95  Unfortunately, the strong, explicit language of the WRFA requiring that 
an employer “initiate . . . an affirmative and bona fide effort” to provide an 
accommodation which, to be reasonable, must “remove the conflict,” threatens to 
                                                                
88Hearings, supra note 31, at 49 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment 
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington, 
D.C.). 
89Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70 (1986). 
90Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
91Id. at 70. 
92Id.  The majority and dissenting opinions highlight the ambiguities inherent in the term 
“eliminate the conflict;” accordingly, I feel that any such language included in WRFA has the 
potential to be misinterpreted and will disproportionately burden the employer in the 
accommodation process. 
93See supra note 82. 
94Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972)). 
95Id. (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (1982)). 
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nullify a spirit of “bilateral cooperation” and impose a system of unilateral employer 
sacrifice.96  Thus, the WRFA approaches the precipice of “religious advancement.” 
b.  “Why Don’t You Just Tell Me Exactly What You Want!” 
The unilateralism of the obligation under the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 
is further evidenced by a reading of “removing the conflict” that requires the 
employer to implement the reasonable accommodation most beneficial to the 
employee; after all, some might argue that the conflict is not completely removed if 
the employee is denied the opportunity to have his burden reduced by actually 
selecting the accommodation.  Such an intention is supported by two factors.  First, 
Senate Version One of the WRFA included a subsection (separate from the 
subsection on “conflict removal” but incorporated into the same section on 
reasonable accommodation analysis) actually stating that an accommodation would 
not be considered “reasonable” if “the employee demonstrates to the employer the 
availability of an alternative accommodation less onerous to the employee that may 
be made by the employer without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business.”97  Second, the WRFA was introduced to “remedy decisions that have been 
made by the courts over a series of years that . . . have strayed from the original 
intent of Title VII.”98  In Philbrook, the Court rejected a system under which the 
most “employee-beneficial” accommodation would have to be implemented.99  
Because the WRFA already clarifies the Philbrook decision in one other respect by 
ensuring that employees be permitted to use general leave to accommodate religious 
practices,100 it is not unreasonable to conclude that the WRFA would seek to alter 
Philbrook with regard to employee-preferred accommodations.  Accordingly, the 
final version of the WRFA, if enacted, is likely to include—either explicitly or 
subsumed into the duty of “conflict removal”—a requirement that an employer 
implement the reasonable accommodation preferred by the employee. 
A requirement forcing the employer to implement the reasonable accommodation 
preferred by the employee slides the WRFA toward an “absolute” accommodation 
constitutionally forbidden under Lemon.  For example, just as the Connecticut statute 
in Thornton gave the employee the power to unilaterally designate the Sabbath day 
for which he would be relieved of work,101 the WRFA would effectively give the 
employee the power to unilaterally designate which accommodation the employer 
will implement.  In other words, by placing power in the hands of the employee to 
propose and implement his own reasonable accommodation—one that is less 
onerous than the employer’s accommodation and which does not create an undue 
hardship—the WRFA theoretically nullifies the efforts of the employer, giving little, 
                                                                
96See supra notes 77-78; see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
97S. 92, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(B)(i) (1997). 
98Hearings, supra note 31, at 2 (opening statement by Senator Coats). 
99Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69. 
100See supra note 24; see also S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997); see also supra note 
62 (setting forth the full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
101Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985). 
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if any, consideration to his reasonable accommodations, and, yet again, stripping him 
of all discretion in business decisionmaking.102 
Of course, the aforementioned argument must be annotated with the fact that the 
Court in Philbrook never referenced its Thornton decision of the previous year; the 
Philbrook Court found forced adoption of employee-preferred accommodations to be 
explicitly offensive to the plain meaning and legislative history of the 1972 
amendment to Title VII rather than addressing any potential offensiveness to the 
Establishment Clause for “advancement” of religious principles.103  However, this 
author believes that language employed by the Court in Philbrook supports the small 
leap into a Lemon analysis of the kind conducted in Thornton.  In Philbrook, the 
Court described a system in which the employer would be forced to select the 
accommodation preferred by the employee as a system in which “the employee is 
given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the 
fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution to the conflict.”104 This language 
can be directly reconciled with the concern of the Court in Thornton, and the idea 
previously illustrated in this note, that the more control that is given to the employee 
in the accommodation process, the less consideration is given to employer proposals, 
and the more the employer is “held hostage”—backed into a situation of 
acquiescence to the “unilateral” dictates of the religiously-minded employee.105  
Thus, the slippery slope of “absolute” accommodation begins, leading to 
disproportionate “advancement” of religious interests under the Lemon test. 
c.  “‘Absolute’ Means No Exceptions; the WRFA Has One . . . Does It Not?” 
A strong argument can be advanced that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act 
does not force an “absolute” standard on employers because, regardless of whether 
the employer must present accommodations that “remove the conflict” or whether 
the employer must implement the accommodation preferred by the employee, the 
employer can still acquire exemption from accommodating in the face of “undue 
hardship.”106  The problem with this argument is that, in addition to raising “undue 
hardship” to a level requiring “significant difficulty or expense,” the WRFA offers 
an ill-designed, “two-tiered” determination for what constitutes “significant 
difficulty or expense”—the first tier of which denies that “significant difficulty or 
expense” exists short of any accommodation making the employee unable to perform 
the essential functions of his position.107  By so providing, Congress inadvertently 
                                                                
102In Thornton, the Court commented that the Connecticut statute “[allowed] for no 
consideration as to whether the employer [had] made reasonable accommodation proposals.”  
Id. at 710. 
103See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69. 
104Id. at 69 (emphasis added). 
105See text accompanying supra notes 101-102. 
106Hearings, supra note 31, at 56 (statement of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University 
of Denver College of Law, Denver, Co.). 
107I consider “tiers” one and two to consist of (A) and (B), respectively, of the following:  
 (A) an accommodation shall be considered to require significant difficulty or 
expense if the accommodation will result in the inability of an employee to perform the 
essential functions of the employment position of the employee; and 
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created a ridiculous and nearly impossible exemption for employers to obtain in 
certain situations.  For instance, “tier one” implies that any leave of absence (the 
accommodation contemplated in Hardison) offered to an employee would be an 
“undue hardship” because during leave the employee could not perform any of the 
functions of his position; if this were true, an employer would always be excused 
from accommodating, thus nullifying the WRFA’s consideration of job swaps and 
transfers108 and undermining the entire purpose of the WRFA in making it more 
difficult for employers to escape their duty to accommodate for religiously-dedicated 
employees. 
Accordingly, for the WRFA to work, one must assume that the aforementioned 
paradox is not intended.  But then how is an employer to know what 
accommodations create the “significant difficulty or expense” contemplated in “tier 
one?” (i.e., if leave of absence does not, than what does?)  Senator Coats indicated 
that job swaps are a part of the analysis and suggested that “if the employer can show 
that, say, this machinist performs this work, and the job swap that has been proposed 
or arranged involves someone not trained in that technicality, that is a defense for the 
employer.”109  Although the comment by Senator Coats appears to clear the air, 
consider this dilemma: Is the “arranged” job swap “voluntary” as contemplated 
elsewhere in the  WRFA,110 or is it “employer-directed” as connoted in “tier two,” 
which contemplates the “cost . . . of retraining or hiring employees or transferring 
employees from one facility to another.”111  To even hint at the latter is to seriously 
impact coworkers in order to accommodate religion, undoubtedly a serious 
Establishment Clause concern in terms of advancing religion above other secular 
interests.  Admittedly, some of the WRFA hearings indicate that the former of the 
two options is likely intended.112  Yet, even if transfers and swaps are voluntarily 
arranged, the employer is still being mandated to violate a bona fide seniority system 
in order to allow them; this too presents a serious Establishment Clause concern — 
one that will be discussed in greater depth in the next section. 
                                                          
 (B) other factors to be considered in making the determination shall include – 
 (i) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss 
of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or transferring employees from one 
facility to another, in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer; 
  (ii) the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation 
to a religious observance or practice; and 
  (iii) for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree to which the 
geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities will make the 
accommodation more difficult or expensive.   
S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1997); see supra note 62 (setting forth the full text 
of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
108Hearings, supra note 31, at 48 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment 
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington, 
D.C.). 
109Id. at 62 (comment of Senator Coats). 
110See S. 1124 § 2(b)(4); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
111S. 1124 § 2(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added). 
112See Hearings, supra note 31, at 60-64. 
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Meanwhile, consider further this scenario: The implication of Senator Coats’s 
comment is that as long as an employee is replaced with another who can perform 
the same job, the essential functions of the accommodated employee’s position are 
still able to be performed and, thus, there is no “significant difficulty or expense.”  
Accordingly, if the replacement performs the functions at a lesser rate of productivity 
the employer must simply accept that fact under the WRFA.  Although “tier two” 
contemplates calculation of loss of productivity, the “and” between tiers one and two 
suggests that fulfillment of “tier one” is a prerequisite to consideration under “tier 
two.”  In other words, it is not an “either/or” analysis.  Thus, a productivity analysis 
would only be conducted if a job swap could not be made or if the essential functions 
of the accommodated employee’s position could not be performed.  As a result, the 
WRFA disproportionately values religious needs over secular concerns by permitting 
overall decreases in productivity—something which, over time, will impact co-
workers in the form of decreased profits and stagnant wages.  In short, just as 
opponents of the de minimis standard argued that the Court in Hardison had “read 
the adjective ‘undue’ out of [Title VII,]”113 Congress, albeit unintentionally, is 
reading the exemption of “undue hardship” out of Title VII altogether.  The closer 
that Congress comes to accomplishing this blunder, the greater the degree to which 
“reasonable” advances to “absolute,” and the closer the WRFA comes to 
constitutional slaughter. 
3.  Seniority: Not What It Used to Be 
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act threatens to violate the Establishment 
Clause by mandating violations of the bona fide seniority systems of collective 
bargaining agreements.  In Hardison, the District Court held that the union’s duty to 
accommodate Hardison’s religious belief did not require it to ignore its seniority 
system.114 In so holding, the District Court expressed concern that if it did not find 
violation of a seniority system to constitute an undue hardship, then accommodations 
of religious observances might impose “‘a priority of the religious over the secular’ . 
. . thereby [raising] significant questions as to the constitutionality of [Title VII] 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”115  While not directly 
addressing the Establishment Clause implications, the Supreme Court did agree with 
the District Court’s analysis by stating that “we do not believe that the duty to 
accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid 
[collective bargaining] agreement.”116  
Nevertheless, the Court supplemented that statement by implying that while it 
disfavored mandatory, employer-imposed shift-swapping, which would deprive other 
employees of their shift preference, voluntary shift-swapping among employees 
might be acceptable.117  Therefore, the WRFA’s command that violation of a bona 
                                                                
113See Schuchman, supra note 23, at 761 (citation omitted). 
114Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 69 (1977). 
115Id. at 70 n.4 (citations omitted). 
116Id. at 79. 
117The Court stated that “there were no volunteers to relieve Hardison on Saturdays, and to 
give Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift 
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fide seniority system may not be a defense to an unlawful employment practice if the 
accommodation consisted of voluntary exchanges of shifts or jobs among employees 
might withstand scrutiny.118  But, again, as is true of much of constitutional law, the 
question is one of degree.  What of the WRFA provision that violation of a bona fide 
seniority system may not be a defense to a claim of unlawful employment practice if, 
in order to make the necessary accommodation, “an adjustment would be made in 
the employee’s work hours . . . that would not be available to any employee but for 
such accommodation?”119  If hour and shift adjustments are not generally available to 
any employee, then this accommodation provides more than an incidental benefit to 
religion by breaking the collective bargaining agreement only for religiously-minded 
employees. 
Theoretically, the answer depends upon whether one characterizes collective 
bargaining agreements as purely private contracts or as publicly regulated accords.120  
Generally, the Supreme Court has begun to favor accommodations that can be seen 
to lift governmentally-imposed burdens on religious practice or on religious 
institutions.121  Still, the Establishment Clause concern is much greater, as expressed 
by the District Court in Hardison,122 when the burden appears to be privately 
imposed.  One scholar noted the difficulty of a court interfering with a strictly private 
contract:  
If the terms of a labor contract serve to make the accord truly private then 
there is no government imposed burden that can be said to be lifted by an 
accommodation if religious impingement is caused by a substantive term 
of the agreement.  Thus, the Supreme Court would not have been able to 
find a constitutionally viable way to exempt . . . Hardison when he was 
compelled to work on the Sabbath by the ostensibly neutral application of 
the collective bargaining agreement’s seniority system.123 
Thus, if today’s Court chose to defer to the immediately preceding reasoning, 
there is a very grave possibility that it would view both a breach of a seniority 
system for voluntary job swaps, and a breach for the purpose of altering shift and 
hour assignments—not otherwise alterable for employees for nonreligious reasons—
                                                          
preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday 
Sabbath.”  Id. at 81. 
118See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(B) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the 
full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
119S. 1124 § 2(b)(4)(A). 
120See generally Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor 
Relations Act, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185 (1996) (discussing, generally, the 
difference between publicly and privately imposed burdens, the views of the Supreme Court 
with regard to accommodations that lift governmentally-imposed burdens, and how collective 
bargaining can be viewed as either a publicly or privately imposed burden). 
121Id. at 190. 
122See supra text accompanying note 115. 
123Corrada, supra note 120, at 250. 
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as too great a deprivation of the private contractual rights of co-workers and a clearly 
unconstitutional “‘[prioritization] of the religious over the secular.’”124 
Conversely, if today’s Court were inclined to expand the view that “collective 
bargaining . . . lies at the core of our national labor policy,”125 then it would adopt the 
view of collective bargaining as a type of governmentally-imposed burden to be 
lifted by the Workplace Religious Freedom Act.  Consequently, the Court would 
scrutinize the WRFA under the analysis set forth in Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, a case in which it 
upheld an exemption from Title VII’s religious nondiscrimination requirement for 
religious organizations.126  In an opinion authored by Justice White, and joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell, Stevens, and Scalia, the Court 
expressed favor for accommodations made to lift governmentally-imposed burdens: 
[The Court] has never indicated that statutes that give special 
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid.  That would run 
contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for 
accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause.  Where, as 
here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that 
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the 
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.127 
Although an Amos-tailored analysis would undoubtedly prove favorable to the 
collective bargaining provisions of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, it is 
somewhat doubtful that a complete shift in the characterization of collective-
bargaining agreements, from purely private to purely public, will occur any time 
soon.128  In other words, “the NLRA’s encouragement of collective bargaining, 
specifically, should not be used as a shield when the statutory command, as well as 
overall Supreme Court interpretation, conceives of these agreements as being private 
in nature.”129  Ultimately, it is just as likely as not that the Supreme Court will take a 
cautious approach to the WRFA’s interference with fairly-negotiated, neutrally 
applied collective bargaining agreements, therefore, finding Establishment Clause 
concerns too great to ignore. 
VI.  A “LEMON” BY ANY OTHER NAME . . . 
Since the Lemon decision in 1972, the Court has, from time to time, strayed from 
Lemon’s three-pronged analysis, emphasizing that “[n]o per se rule can be framed”130 
for Establishment Clause jurisprudence and expressing its “unwillingness to be 
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.”131  Despite frequent 
                                                                
124See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
125Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 70 n.4. (1977). 
126483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
127Id. at 338. 
128See Corrada, supra note 120, at 251. 
129Id. at 252. 
130Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1983). 
131Id. at 679. 
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departures, however, the Court always seems to come back to the Lemon test for, as 
most humorously noted by Justice Scalia, the Lemon test is like a “ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being 
repeatedly killed and buried. . . .”132 
Because the Lemon test figured prominently in both Cummins and Thornton, the 
two cases providing the most insight into the Court’s thinking on Title VII’s 
“reasonable accommodations,”133 this author believes that the Court will revert to the 
use of the Lemon test to analyze any future amendment to Title VII challenged on 
Establishment Clause grounds.134  However, this note would be deficient without 
discussion of proposed modifications to Lemon,135 as well as its near abandonment 
by Justices who have attempted to exorcise that “ghoul” through development of the 
“neutrality,” “endorsement,” and “coercion” tests. 
A.  “Accommodationism” and “Neutrality” 
Generally, Amos has been identified as one of the decisions signaling a change in 
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence—away from strict “separationism” 
to “accommodationism.”136  The “separationist” view, which gave birth to the Lemon 
test, does not favor any form of government aid to religion, while the 
“accommodationist” view, as the name implies, is more receptive to governmental 
accommodations for religious interests.137  One writer has grouped Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as “separationists” tending to uphold Establishment 
Clause challenges, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas as 
“accommodationists” tending to reject Establishment Clause challenges.138 While 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are somewhat harder to categorize, some feel that 
they both swing toward the accommodationist end of the spectrum.139  As will be 
shown, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have exerted the greatest influence in 
reformulating the Lemon test. 
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, Justice 
O’Connor suggested that a unitary approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
should give way to the application of several, narrower, more precise tests.140  While 
                                                                
132Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
133See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text. 
134As Scalia quipped, “such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least 
in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.”  Id. 
135See Miller, supra note 23, at 807-13. 
136See generally Id. at 251-52; see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 696-97 
(1992) (identifying Amos as a recent Supreme Court decision shifting doctrine to 
accommodationism). 
137See Miller, supra note 23, at 809-11. 
138See Sedler, supra note 66, at 1337. 
139See generally Corrada, supra note 120, at 251-62. 
140512 U.S. 687, 721 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In Kiryas Joel, the Court held 
that a New York statute creating a special school district following the boundaries of the 
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stating that abandonment of the Lemon test need not mean abandonment of the 
insights reflected in the test, or the case law applying the test, O’Connor felt that, 
ultimately, Establishment Clause analysis would benefit if freed from “Lemon’s . . . 
rigid influence.”141 
Although not commanding a majority in Kiryas Joel, Justices Souter, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Ginsburg caught O’Connor’s wave of change by emphasizing a 
“neutrality” test in which the government should neither “favor . . . one religion over 
others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.”142  Interestingly 
enough, while Blackmun supported the “neutrality” approach, he concurred 
separately to make clear that he “[remained] convinced of the general validity of the 
basic principles stated in Lemon, which have guided [the] Court’s Establishment 
Clause decisions in over 30 cases.”143  Additionally, while expressing doubts about 
Lemon, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, lacked 
confidence in any existing alternative, stating that “[t]o replace Lemon with nothing 
is simply to announce that we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even 
to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed 
by any principle.”144  The concurrence of Justice Kennedy did not directly address 
Lemon but expressed an air of general favorability for religious accommodation.145 
Thus, the overall implication of Kiryas Joel, is as follows: Justices Souter, 
Stevens, Ginsburg, and O’Connor are likely to alter or abandon Lemon in the future;  
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist are more likely to retain 
Lemon.  Justice Kennedy, as an “accommodationist” may also support an alternative 
to Lemon.146  
Realistically, however, the degree of prominence of the “neutrality” test in any 
future challenge to a Title VII amendment like the WRFA will bear very little on the 
outcome of the case.  Actually, the “neutrality” test is extremely similar to Lemon, 
prompting one commentator to articulate that it may serve nothing more than to 
demonstrate that the second prong of the Lemon test (i.e., that the primary effect of 
the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion) is the most important of the 
three prongs.147  Thus, the analysis presented in this note, suggesting possible 
Establishment Clause violations under the second prong of Lemon, would not change 
much, if at all, under a “neutrality” test. 
                                                          
Village of Kiryas Joel—a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim Jews—violative of the 
Establishment Clause because it was “tantamount to an allocation of political power on a 
religious criterion and neither presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward 
religion . . . .”  Id. at 690. 
141Id. at 721 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
142Id. at 696 (citations omitted). 
143Id. at 710-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
144512 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
145Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy did, however, object to the fact 
that the New York legislature specifically drew the Kiryas Joel school district along religious 
lines.  Id. at 729. 
146See Corrada, supra note 120, at 263. 
147See Miller, supra note 23, at 809. 
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Furthermore, despite the fact that some believe that an “accommodationist” 
majority exists on the Court at this time,148 those accommodationists still believe that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others and the 
favoring of religion over nonreligion.149  As has been stated throughout, this author 
feels that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act disproportionately favors religious 
adherents over those who are secularly oriented.  Likewise, this author detects a 
subtle element in the Workplace Religious Freedom Act by which one or more 
religions are potentially favored over others; such is evident in the WRFA’s “two-
tiered” system for determining what constitutes “significant difficulty or expense” 
and, thus, “undue hardship.”150  One of the second-tier factors given consideration is 
the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation to a religious 
observance or practice.151  Disregarding other concerns regarding the application of 
factors in tiers one and two,152 there is a significant danger (from a cost analysis point 
of view) associated with taking a cumulative, numbers-based “undue hardship” 
approach; one scholar has illustrated it in the following: 
[A]n employer who had made an accommodation to employee X could 
deny the same accommodation to employee Y because this added expense 
would push the total cost of accommodation above the de minimis ceiling.  
Every religious employee who requires reasonable accommodation is 
entitled to some accommodation regardless of previous accommodations 
the employer has made for other employees.  Otherwise, a religious 
employee’s accommodation would depend on the mere happenstance of 
the number of other employees who had beaten him to the request.153 
Similarly, Establishment Clause concerns run high where the plausibility of an 
accommodation is measured, in part, by sheer numbers.  For example, assume an 
employer employs sixty people in a factory; out of the sixty, twenty are Catholics 
                                                                
148Id. at 811-12 (suggesting that if O’Connor adopted the neutrality test, then an 
accommodationist majority would exist with O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Kennedy, upholding Title VII as is and would likely uphold an amendment incorporating 
aspects of the 1996 EEOC guidelines). 
149See 512 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that he always believed that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others.); see also Agostini v. 
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding, by a majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, the constitutionality of New York 
City’s Title I program, in part, because the services were allocated on the basis of criteria that 
neither favored nor disfavored religion and because the services were available to all children 
who met the Act’s eligibility requirement, no matter what their religious beliefs). 
150See supra note 107. 
151See supra note 107. 
152See supra text accompanying notes 107-113. 
153See Miller, supra note 23, at 804.  Miller advocates the adoption of an “individualizing” 
formula under which undue hardship would be calculated as “any yearly expenditure per 
employee that exceeded fifty percent of the employer’s annual net income divided by the 
average number of full-time employees.  Id. at 801-802 (citing Steven B. Epstein, In Search of 
a Bright Line: Determining When an Employee’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” 
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1995)). 
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requesting Good Friday off and two are Seventh Day Adventists requesting Saturday 
off for Sabbath observance.  In all likelihood, the employer can afford to 
accommodate the two Seventh Day Adventists, because they only represent just over 
three percent of the total workforce.  However, the employer is not going to be able 
to accommodate the twenty Catholics, which comprise thirty-three percent of the 
workforce.  If sheer numbers dictate which accommodations are made, and which 
are not, then “minority” religions (those with a smaller membership) will nearly 
always be granted their accommodations and, thus, will be favored over religions 
with greater memberships whose members may request accommodations in larger 
groups. 
Consider, further, the same employer, except that this time five Catholics are 
requesting Holy Saturday off and four Jewish employees are requesting the same 
Saturday off for Sabbath observance.  Supposing that the employer had 
predetermined that on this particular Saturday he could only accommodate six 
employees without incurring an undue hardship, each group would be denied the 
accommodation altogether, whereas each separately would be eligible.  Granted, 
neither is being “favored” over the other, but the system still lacks good sense.  
Therefore, if the sponsors of the WRFA want to avoid Establishment Clause 
violations and “restore the original intent of Title VII’s protections . . .”154 then the 
WRFA must assure that each individual has his accommodation request reviewed 
separately. 
B.  “Endorsement” 
While Justice O’Connor’s discontentment with Lemon is evident in Kiryas Joel, 
she actually began streamlining the three prongs of the Lemon test into an 
“endorsement” analysis nearly two decades ago in Lynch v. Donnelly:155 
Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or 
disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device. . . . 
The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the 
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval 
of religion. . . . [Likewise], what is crucial is that a government practice 
not have the effect of communicating a message of government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.156 
Four years after her opinion in Lynch, O’Connor reiterated her displeasure with 
Lemon in Amos:  “The inquiry framed by the Lemon test should be ‘whether 
government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys 
a message of endorsement.’”157  A majority of the Court brought O’Connor’s 
                                                                
154See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
155465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In Lynch, the Court held that 
the inclusion of a creche in a city Christmas display, which included a Christmas tree, a Santa 
Clause House, and seasonal banners, did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 687. 
156Id. at 689-92. 
157Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 69, 76 (1985)). 
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“endorsement” analysis to the fore just two years after Amos in Allegheny v. 
A.C.L.U.158  While employing the Lemon test in holding that a freestanding display 
of a nativity scene on the main staircase of a county courthouse violated the 
Establishment Clause, a majority in Allegheny acknowledged that the Court had, in 
recent years, begun to focus on whether governmental practices had the purpose or 
effect of endorsing religion.159  Recognizing the difficulty in defining “endorsement,” 
and words of similar effect, the majority simply expounded:  “The Establishment 
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on 
questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”160 
Practically speaking, the “endorsement” test would not alter the foregoing 
Establishment Clause analysis regarding the Workplace Religious Freedom Act.  
Governmental “endorsement” of religion is evident in the WRFA’s higher threshold 
for “undue hardship” and its virtual mandate that employers acquiesce to employee-
proposed accommodations.  In short, regardless of whether Lemon’s second prong is 
applied, or a revised version of Lemon’s second prong emphasizing “endorsement,” 
this note concludes that the government, through the WRFA, takes an 
unconstitutional position in favor of religious belief. 
C.  “Coercion” 
Unsatisfied with the Lemon test, and blasting the “endorsement” test as “flawed 
in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice,”161 Justice Kennedy authored his 
own opinion in Allegheny stressing the need to examine the coercive nature of 
government action: 
The freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference 
or oppression is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Banning all attempts to aid religion through government 
coercion goes far toward attainment of this object.162 
Kennedy’s “coercion” analysis took center stage in Lee v. Weisman, as the Court 
held violative of the Establishment Clause the inclusion of prayers in a public middle 
school graduation ceremony because they compelled students to conform to a 
religious exercise:163 
                                                                
158492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989). 
159Id. at 592. 
160Id. 
161Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Justice Kennedy rejected 
the endorsement test, in part, because he felt that many of the traditional and historical 
practices of the United States would not withstand scrutiny under its formula, e.g., The Pledge 
of Allegiance describes the United States as “one Nation under God;” the Supreme Court 
opens its sessions with the request that “God save the United States and this honorable Court.”  
Id. at 669-74. 
162492 U.S. at 660. 
163505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992). 
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The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of 
religion does not supercede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.  It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way 
which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.”164 
Although the “coercion” test is largely confined to the school prayer cases out of 
which it developed, its application to the WRFA is not out of the question.165  Still, 
the WRFA’s excessive mandates in support of religion would not be spared 
constitutional defeat under this test. 
VII.  EVER ONWARD 
Title VII, as currently structured and interpreted, is, unquestionably, a socially 
beneficial law; it recognizes the value of religious observance, while still respecting 
the Establishment Clause by minimizing the degree to which it orders employer-
sacrifice in the name of religion.  The Workplace Religious Freedom Act, 
conversely, distorts the meaning of “accommodation” and threatens to push 
employers into “absolute,” and unilateral acquiescence to religious interests.  
Ultimately, the cumulative effect of Establishment Clause concerns expressed herein 
make the Workplace Religious Freedom Act a sure target for constitutional challenge 
—which in terms of legislative scorekeeping means that WRFA is a loser before 
even getting out of the gates. 
While the Workplace Religious Freedom Act has been debated since 1994,166 
some in Congress have openly admitted that “a substantial majority of employers are 
making good faith efforts to accommodate the provisions of [Title VII . . . and] one 
of the most egregious violations does not occur in private business but occurs within 
Government.”167  Accordingly, this author suggests that, perhaps, Title VII is best 
                                                                
164Id. at 587. 
165Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), laid the groundwork for Justice Kennedy’s 
development of the modern “coercion” analysis.  In Engel, the Court struck down a daily 
school prayer program while emphasizing that, “when the power, prestige and financial 
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive 
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.”  Id. at 431. 
The “coercion” test is most appropriately used in cases like Lee and Engel where 
governmental action subjects a person to a particular religious thought or exercise at a 
particular time and place.  See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 
1992) (upholding school district resolution allowing public high school students to choose 
student volunteers to deliver “nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations” at graduation 
ceremonies), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Brown v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 112 
F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Georgia law mandating a moment of silence in 
public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Mississippi statute condoning student 
initiated prayer at assemblies and sporting events violates the Establishment Clause). 
166See supra note 5. 
167Hearings, supra note 31, at 4 (statement of Senator Coats). 
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left untouched.  Frankly, Congress must share the sentiment, otherwise WRFA 
would have passed long ago, even in the face of business-lobby opposition.   
Realistically, accommodations for religious practice can be achieved outside of 
the context of Title VII and this note concludes with a few creative ideas for a 
Congress looking to aid Sabbath and Holy Day observers. 
A.  Look to the Family 
Few can dispute the fact that religion often forms the core of another very 
important concept—family.  Families attend religious services together, they pray 
together at home, and they share in ceremonial rites and meals.  Even families that 
do not observe a formal religion still may seek spirituality in life, still encourage 
members to live out certain morals and values, and may view shared time together to 
be just as fulfilling as any religious service.  With these thoughts in mind, Congress 
should pursue a more broadly-based “Family Leave Policy.”  The “Family Leave 
Policy” should be one having room enough to recognize religious observance in the 
scope of family life, but one that is removed from the “religiously-directed” Title VII 
and one which would be equally applicable to accommodate nonreligious family 
activity—a cherished American value in and of itself.  The Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act recognizes the potential of such a “leave policy” by seeking to ensure 
that employers could not deny employees from taking leave of general usage for the 
purpose of accommodating religious observance or practice.168  A limited “Family 
Leave Policy” could be carved out of the existing Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA).169 
Basically, the FMLA provides that any employer170 must provide a minimum of 
twelve workweeks of leave171 in any twelve-month period to any eligible employee172 
                                                                
168S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997).  Specifically, the WRFA states the following: 
An employer shall be considered to [have committed an unlawful employment 
practice] by failing to provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if 
the employer refuses to permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to 
remove such a conflict solely because the leave will be used to accommodate the 
religious observance or practice of the employee. 
Id. 
16929 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. (1998). 
170The term “employer” means:  
(i) any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce 
who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more 
calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year; (ii) includes (I) any 
person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the 
employees of such employer; and (II) any successor in interest of an employer; (iii) 
includes any “public agency,” as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and (iv) 
includes the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.   
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1998). 
171Leave may be unpaid except for a situation where the leave is being used by the 
employee for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the 
functions of his position.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (1998).  Generally, only leave which is taken 
for the care of a child, spouse, or parent with a serious health condition, or because the 
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for any of the following: 1) to care for a newborn child; 2) to care for a foster child; 
3) to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition; 4) because of 
a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions 
of the position of such employee.173  Because one of the major purposes for 
providing the foregoing leave is “to balance the demands of the workplace with the 
needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to 
promote national interests in preserving family integrity,”174 it is natural to propose a 
fifth condition for leave (subsection (5) above) for “other compelling family 
reasons.”  Under such an amendment, an employee would be permitted to borrow a 
maximum of ten days, from the previously defined twelve workweeks, in any 
twelve-month period; unlike other provisions in the FMLA, the ten days could only 
be used intermittently.175  So as to relieve some of the burden to the employer, the 
leave would be unpaid, with no possible substitution of any paid leave or vacation 
time.176  Furthermore, an employee would not be eligible to use the family leave 
during any week when they also sought to utilize paid leave or vacation time.   
Admittedly, leave for any “compelling family reason” creates a potential for 
abuse; for example, an employee might assert use of a day in order to recover from a 
hang-over.  However, potential abuse can be curbed by requiring the employee to 
give a minimum of fifteen days’ notice to his employer before using one of the days 
and also, when requested by the employer, to give written notice of the purpose for 
which the time is to be used.177 
B.  Maximum Hours and Schedule Control 
As touched upon earlier, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act suggested 
alteration of collective bargaining agreements to allow for adjustment to an 
employee’s work hours in order to accommodate religious observance.178  However, 
excessive tampering with collective bargaining agreements, in the context of Title 
VII, could present grave Establishment Clause concerns if the Court adopted a view 
of collective bargaining agreements as private.179  Still maintaining that government 
                                                          
employee has a serious health condition, may be taken intermittently.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) 
(1998). 
172Basically, the term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed 1) 
for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under 
subsection 2612 of this title; and 2) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer 
during the previous 12-month period.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1998); see also 29 U.S.C. § 
2611(2)(B) (1998) (setting forth exclusions). 
17329 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1998). 
17429 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1998). 
175See supra note 171-173. 
176See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d) (1998) (identifying unpaid leave and substitution of 
paid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act). 
177See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (1998) (identifying notice requirement under Family 
and Medical Leave Act). 
178See supra text accompanying note 119; see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text 
of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act). 
179See supra text accompanying notes 114-129. 
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
1999] POLITICS OF RELIGION 279 
should not mandate alterations in privately negotiated accords strictly in the name of 
religion, this author proposes an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.180  An 
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act could potentially benefit Sabbath 
observers, while again, removing the benefit from the religiously-directed Title VII 
analysis and placing the benefit in the hands of all workers—religious and 
nonreligious alike.181 
Basically, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay one and one-
half times the regular rate of pay for an amount of time in excess of forty hours 
worked by an employee in one week.182  The Fair Labor Standards Act regulates pay 
for the above hours because “Congress finds that the existence . . . of labor 
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . leads to labor 
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in 
commerce . . . .”183  A substantial amount of labor discord and employee 
discontentment could be relieved by allowing employees to exercise minimal control 
over scheduled work hours.  For example, an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act could provide the following: 
Upon request, no employee shall be denied scheduling control over one 
“twenty-four hour block of time” (of the employee’s choice) during the 
course of any week, provided that after determining the use or non-use of 
said twenty-four hour period, the employee is still able to fulfill a 
minimum forty hour workweek and provided that if any employee seeks 
to use general leave of any kind or vacation time in the same week, he 
loses the right to control over any twenty-four hour period. 
What the above amendment accomplishes is an opportunity for employees, who 
happen to be members of two-job households, to coordinate “off-time” with a spouse 
or other family member and to prevent a workweek or weekend of overly 
burdensome scheduling.  The amendment also gives Sabbath observers the flexibility 
to have a twenty-four hour period during any day of the week that they observe as 
religiously sacred, but it does not cater specifically to them, and, thus, avoids most of 
the Establishment Clause concerns previously raised with regard to Title VII and the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act.  Furthermore, the amendment takes into 
consideration inconvenience to employers who may only schedule shifts Monday-
                                                                
18029 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998). 
181This author is aware of the exemption from the Fair Labor Standard Act’s maximum 
hour requirements for employers and employees covered under certain types of collective 
bargaining agreements.  See 29 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1998).  I reiterate hesitation at infringing too 
greatly upon the rights of parties to bargain collectively; however, I put forward the notion that 
there is a grave difference between infringing upon those rights in the name of religion, and 
infringing upon those rights in the name of all employees.  I make this point as a way of 
rectifying the suggestion that the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act proposed herein 
be applicable regardless of collective bargaining agreements to the contrary with my previous 
discussion of Establishment Clause concerns inherent in provisions of the Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act.  See supra text accompanying notes 114-129. 
18229 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1998). 
18329 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1998). 
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Friday by requiring that employees work a full forty hour week in order to exert 
control over one twenty-four hour period i.e. employees who traditionally work only 
Monday-Friday would be prevented from utilizing the Act to schedule an extra day 
off during the week.  Ultimately, the amendment would promote a fair and flexible 
work atmosphere “without substantially curtailing employment or earning power,”184 
and without appearing to favor only religiously-dedicated employees. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Unquestionably, religious observance is an important aspect of the lives of many, 
and no one should be forced to sacrifice his/her beliefs.  However, the Workplace 
Religious Freedom Act is sloppy, constitutionally ill-fated legislation that should be 
forgotten.  Congressional time would best be spent revising existing labor legislation 
to provide broadly-based “Family Leave Policies” or to grant minimal scheduling 
control to employees; then, both programs can be voluntarily applied towards 
religious observances rather than unconstitutionally mandated. 
GREGORY J. GAWLIK185 
                                                                
18429 U.S.C. § 202(b) (1998). 
185I dedicate this note to my loving parents and loyal sister whose undying strength and 
support have made my success possible.  In addition, I wish to express my sincere 
appreciation to Professors Stephen R. Lazarus and Kevin Francis O’Neill, both of whom 
provided valuable advice and guidance. 
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss2/7
